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Has Illegal Insider Trading Become More Rampant in the United States? Empirical 
Evidence from Takeovers1 
 
 
Laura Nyantung Beny and H. Nejat Seyhun2 
 
 
Introduction 
 
Insider trading3 has long sparked popular outrage about the perceived excesses of 
Wall Street and corporate insiders’ abuse of their privileged positions at the expense of 
                                                 
1 We are both grateful for the excellent research assistantship by Mr. Eser Ates of 
University of Michigan. 
2 Beny is a Professor of Law at the University of Michigan Law School.  Seyhun 
is Jerome B. and Eilene M. York Professor of Business Administration and Professor of 
Finance at the Ross School of Business at the University of Michigan.   
3 Insider trading is defined as trading by individuals or corporations based on 
illegally obtained material, non-public information. In most jurisdictions, including the 
USA, material information is information that reasonable investors would consider likely 
1
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ordinary investors (i.e., widows, orphans and the rest of us). This is especially true during 
economic recessions and capital market downturns, as in recent years. At such times, 
populist outrage over insider trading and other types of corporate fraud soars to peak 
levels. In turn, this places great pressure on regulators and prosecutors to pursue alleged 
inside traders with greater ferocity than in economic normal times.4 Indeed, in the last 
few years, USA federal authorities have increased the ante, enforcing insider trading laws 
with renewed vigor. 
A prominent recent example is the Galleon case, the largest insider trading 
scandal in the USA in decades. This case ultimately resulted in 2011 in a criminal 
conviction and an eleven-year prison sentence for Raj Rajaratnam, the man at the center 
of the scandal. The case involved widespread information networks and insider trading at 
several prominent hedge funds, including Galleon Management, LP, the former multi-
billion dollar hedge fund founded and run by Mr. Rajaratnam. The USA government 
alleged that various high-level executives at such illustrious companies as McKinsey & 
Co., Intel Corporation, and IBM had provided material non-public information to the 
                                                                                                                                                 
to affect the financial security’s price, and non-public information is information that is 
not available to investors who are corporate outsiders. 
4 See Stuart Banner, Anglo-American Securities Regulation: Cultural and Political 
Roots, 1690-1860 (2002). 
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hedge funds. Through a complex network of business and personal relationships and 
information sharing, the Galleon scheme yielded more than $49 million in illegal profits 
or loss avoidance. The USA Department of Justice (DOJ) and the Securities and 
Exchange Commission (SEC) aggressively pursued the alleged culprits in a variety of 
civil and criminal proceedings. Along the way, they have issued stern remarks in the 
press, presumably both to warn would-be offenders and to feed populist sentiment. 
Furthermore, USA authorities claim to have many more insider trading 
enforcement actions in the pipeline: “The current investigation—which traces its roots to 
an SEC inquiry in 2007 and FBI agents gaining court approval to use wiretaps to snare 
targets—has resulted in 66 people being charged with insider trading and related crimes, 
and 57 convictions, the largest crackdown on insider trading in modern law enforcement 
history.”5 According to federal law enforcement officials, cases have been “scheduled 
out” for the next 5 years and it is likely that “hundreds” of individuals will be charged in 
the coming years, including another hedge fund industry player of similar stature to Mr. 
Rajaratnam. SAC Capital and Citadel Investments are two of the large hedge funds that 
have been issued subpoenas in the current investigation.6  
                                                 
5 Charlie Gasparino & Sital Patel, Here’s a Tip: Insider Trading Cases Will Pile 
Up for Years, FOX Business, February 21, 2012 
6 Id.  
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Another recent development is the increasing severity of punishment upon 
conviction for insider trading offenses. Both the probability of serving in prison as well 
as length of prison sentences have significantly increased. Between 1993 and 1999, fewer 
than 5% of defendants received two or more years of prison sentences upon conviction. 
This ratio increased to more than 25% between 2000 and 2009, and about 50% in the last 
two years. These findings indicate a ten-fold increase in the probability of receiving a 
prison sentence over the past fifteen years or so. Similarly, the median length of prison 
sentences given by the courts also rose. Between 1993 and 1999, the median prison 
sentence was only 11.5 months. During the past decade, the median prison sentence rose 
to 18 months. Finally, in the past two years, the median prison sentence for convicted 
defendants in New York federal courts rose to 2.5 years in prison, which indicates more 
than doubling of the length of prison sentences.7 From all outward appearances, then, it 
appears that federal insider trading enforcement, convictions and sentences are on the 
rise. Indeed, in Part II we present evidence that civil enforcement has increased 
significantly over time. 
How should we interpret this evidence of increased enforcement intensity? One 
explanation is that the USA (popular opinion, regulators, etc.) has become less tolerant of 
                                                 
7 See Chad Bray & Rob Barry, Long Jail Terms on the Rise, The Wall Street 
Journal, October 13, 2011. 
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illegal insider trading. Another possibility is that insider trading has become more 
profitable in spite of enhanced enforcement efforts. As a consequence, there is more 
crime and thus more visible enforcement. While we are unable systematically to test the 
first explanation (increased intolerance), we can test the second explanation, which we 
refer to as the increased illegal trading hypothesis.  
In this study, we test the increased illegal insider trading hypothesis by examining 
the pricing of common stock and options in the context of corporate takeovers. Corporate 
takeovers provide an excellent opportunity to engage in illegal insider trading in the 
common stock and call options of a target firm. Stock prices typically jump significantly 
on announcement of the takeover attempt. Call options on the target stock provide an 
even bigger windfall gain to option traders by enabling them to further leverage the 
announcement day returns on target shares. 
We investigate our hypothesis using a sample of 1,177 tender offers between 
1996 and 2011. We pursue two methodologies. First, we examine abnormal returns to 
target firms’ stock around the takeover announcement. The increased illegal insider 
trading hypothesis predicts that the pre-bid stock price run-up has increased over time, 
consistent with greater profitability and incidence of illegal insider trading. 
Second, we examine the pricing of call options on target firms’ stocks around the 
takeover announcement. If the increased illegal insider trading hypothesis is valid, the 
call options should exhibit increasing evidence of rich pricing prior to takeover 
5
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announcements over time. That is, if increased insider trading is responsible for the pre-
bid volume and price effects on bidder firms’ stocks, we will observe an increase in the 
implied volatility of the target firms’ stock because insiders will bid up the price of the 
target options by taking large options positions to benefit from the stock price run-up. 
Option prices are monotonically and positively related to option volatility. We implement 
the binomial option pricing model to compute implied volatilities. 
 Our results are consistent with the increased illegal trading hypothesis. We find 
that the average pre-announcement stock price run-up for target firms has increased 
substantially between 1996 and 2011, which cannot be explained by changes in initial 
toehold investments but is consistent with an increase in the incidence of insider trading. 
We also find that implied option volatilities increase prior to the tender offer 
announcement date, consistent with the presence of illegal insider trading. Finally, we 
find a (weakly) positive relationship between implied volatility and the pre-bid price run-
up, which is also consistent with our increased illegal insider trading hypothesis. Overall, 
our evidence suggests that the recent increase in USA enforcement intensity is likely due 
to an increase in the incidence of illegal insider trading. 
The Article is organized as follows. Part II provides an overview of USA federal 
insider trading law and presents SEC enforcement trends over time. Part III presents our 
hypotheses and empirical methodology. Part IV presents the data and empirical results. 
Finally, Part V concludes. 
6
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I. Overview of USA federal insider trading law and enforcement 
 
A. Substantive law 
 
There are three main doctrines according to which trading on material non-public 
information is illegal under USA federal laws. These are the disclose or abstain rule, 
misappropriation theory and Rule 14e-3 of the Securities Exchange Act.8 
The disclose or abstain rule emerged from the USA Supreme Court’s 
interpretation of § 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and Rule 10b-5 
promulgated thereunder. In Chiarella v. United States9 and Dirks v. SEC,10,the USA 
Supreme Court held that the basis for insider trading liability is breach of a fiduciary duty 
that the defendant owes to contemporaneous traders. That is, if a corporate insider owes a 
fiduciary duty to shareholders trading contemporaneously, he or she has a duty to 
disclose the material non-public information or refrain from trading. The insiders upon 
                                                 
8 See generally Stephen M. Bainbridge, Securities Law: Insider Trading (1999). 
9 445 U.S. 222 (1980). 
10 463 U.S. 646 (1983). 
7
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whom such a fiduciary duty rests obviously include officers, directors and controlling 
shareholders.  
However, USA courts have also interpreted the disclose or abstain rule to include 
various corporate outsiders, deemed “constructive insiders”, under certain circumstances. 
In particular, “[t]he outsider must obtain material nonpublic information from the issuer. 
The issuer must expect the outsider to keep the disclosed information confidential. 
Finally, the relationship must at least imply such a duty.”11 In addition, a “tippee” who 
has received material non-public information from an insider or constructive insider is 
also subject to the disclose or abstain rule if “the tipper has breached a fiduciary duty by 
disclosing information to the tippee, and the tippee knows or has reason to know of the 
breach of duty.”12  
The USA Supreme Court endorsed the misappropriation theory in U.S. vs. 
O’Hagan.13 In this case, the Court held that an attorney (Mr. O’Hagan) violated § 10(b) 
of the 1934 Exchange Act and Rule 10b-5 when he bought shares and call options on the 
shares of a company that was the subject of a takeover and made a profit of over $4.3 
million. Although the attorney was not an insider of either the takeover target or the 
                                                 
11 Stephen M. Bainbridge, Insider Trading: An Overview 2 (2000). 
12 Id. 
13 U.S. v. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. 642 (1997) 
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acquiring firm, he worked for the law firm that was representing the latter firm (though 
he did not work on the acquisition). The Supreme Court held that he had engaged in 
illegal insider trading by virtue of the fact that he had misappropriated non-public 
information from the entity to whom he owed a fiduciary duty (the law firm), even 
though it was not the issuer of shares.  
Finally, § 14(e) of the Exchange Act and Rule 14e-3 promulgated thereunder 
prohibit insider trading in the context of tender offers. Pursuant to Rule 14e-3, it is illegal 
for any person in knowing possession of material information about a tender offer to buy 
or sell a security while in possession of such information.14 At first blush, the rule seems 
rather broad because it applies to anybody who possesses such information and trades 
without publicly disclosing it before trading. In addition, it does not matter whether she 
received the information directly or indirectly from the target, the offeror, or a third 
person acting on their behalf; the prohibition still applies. Furthermore, liability under 
Rule 14e-3 does not require a pre-existing fiduciary relationship, but attaches to anybody 
who trades while in possession of the aforementioned information. Nevertheless, the 
scope of the rule is quite narrow. It only applies once the offeror has taken significant 
steps toward making its offer to the target company, and it only relates to information 
concerning a tender offer. 
                                                 
14 17 C.F.R. § 240.14e-3. 
9
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B. USA enforcement mechanisms and recent trends 
 
While USA insider trading laws have been relatively stable over the past decade, 
there have been significant changes in enforcement over time, as we demonstrate in this 
section. Federal insider trading laws may be enforced in several ways. First, the SEC may 
pursue civil actions and administrative proceedings. Second, private parties may bring 
civil claims for damages under bother state and federal laws. Finally, the DOJ may bring 
criminal charges.  
The SEC may bring civil actions in federal district court against individuals 
suspected to have violated federal insider trading laws. The civil penalties it may pursue 
include “disgorgement of profits, correction of misleading statements, disclosure of 
material information, or other special remedies. Of these, disgorgement of profits to the 
government is the most commonly used enforcement tool.”15 The SEC may also initiate 
administrative proceedings against market professionals, resulting in disciplinary action 
such as censure, suspension, revocation of registration, etc.16 
                                                 
15 Bainbridge, supra note 5, at 122. 
16 See id.  
10
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In the wake of several high-profile insider trading scandals in the 1980s, the 
Congress increased the monetary penalty exposure of inside traders. In particular, the 
Insider Trading Sanctions Act of 1984 allowed for treble damages against persons who 
violate Rule 10b-5 or 14e-3. With the possibility of disgorgement, this means that those 
who violate insider trading laws face a potential monetary penalty of up to four times 
their illicit profits (or losses avoided) from engaging insider trading. The Insider Trading 
and Securities Fraud Act of 1988 (ITSFA), further increased the array of enforcement 
measures available to the SEC.17  
Private parties may also bring civil suits against inside traders. USA courts have 
long interpreted Rule 10b-5 to contain an implied private right of action. In addition, 
pursuant to Exchange Act § 20A, private parties who traded contemporaneously with 
inside traders may sue for damages of up to the amount of profits (or loss avoided) by the 
inside traders. Private suits are, however, quite rare.  
Finally, the SEC may request the DOJ to undertake a criminal prosecution against 
individuals suspected of having engaged in insider trading. Or, the DOJ may decide to 
prosecute on its own without a referral or request by the SEC. Violation of Rule 10b-5 or 
14e-3 is a felony punishable by a fine of up to $5,000,000 and up to 20 years in prison. 
Criminal prosecutions have become increasingly frequent since the mid-1980s. The SEC 
                                                 
17 See id. 
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and DOJ often work together on insider trading investigations, as the recent high profile 
Galleon case illustrates, and appear to be publicly declaring their commitment to 
increased levels of cooperation.18 
Over the past two decades, while private actions have seemingly remained 
relatively rare, public enforcement has increased significantly. Figure 1 presents 
enforcement actions initiated by the SEC during its fiscal years 1985, and 1990 through 
2011.19 The annual statistics presented in Figure 1 include both civil actions in federal 
district court and administrative proceedings by the SEC. In most years, however, civil 
actions constitute the bulk of the SEC’s enforcement measures. 
 
                                                 
18 Referring to the Galleon hedge fund case, the SEC’s Robert Khuzami recently 
stated that, “Our law enforcement agencies are together much more than the sum of our 
parts. That is why coordination, of which today’s actions [parallel civil and criminal 
actions in the Galleon case] are a prime example, is critically important to the goal of 
rooting our fraud and misconduct in our markets.” Robert Khuzami, SEC Director of 
Enforcement at SEC v. Galleon Management, LP Press Conference (Oct. 16, 2009), 
available at http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/2009/spch101609rk.htm 
19 An SEC fiscal year begins on Oct. 1 of the prior calendar year. Thus, for 
example, fiscal year 2012 began on Oct. 1, 2011 and will end on September 30, 2012.  
12
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Figure 1: SEC Enforcement Actions Fiscal Years 1985. 1990-2011 
Source: http: www.sec.gov.  
 
As Figure 1 shows, the late 1990s marked a fundamental turning point in the 
SEC’s enforcement intensity. To put this evidence into perspective, in 1980, the SEC 
initiated a mere 20 insider trading actions. This number nearly doubled by 1990 to 38 
enforcement actions. Between 1990 and 1995, the SEC brought an average of 34 
enforcement actions per fiscal year, while between 1995 and 2000, the SEC brought an 
average of 42 enforcement actions per fiscal year. Then, between 2000 and 2005, the 
SEC brought an average of 49 actions per fiscal year. The enforcement uptick that 
occurred in the late 1990s, and continued through 2005, does not appear to have been a 
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transitory, one-off reaction to the dot.com boom and bust and the associated corporate 
and financial excesses. Indeed, between 2005 and 2010 the SEC continued to launch an 
average of 49 insider trading enforcement actions annually. Finally in fiscal year 2011, 
the SEC reports that it “brought 57 insider trading actions against 124 individuals and 
entities, a nearly 8 percent increase in the number of filed actions from the prior fiscal 
year.”20  
While we do not have corresponding data on the number of criminal 
investigations or cases initiated by the Justice Department over the past two decades, 
anecdotal evidence suggests that criminal prosecutions have also increased during this 
period. For example, a recent study conducted by the New York State Bar Association’s 
Commercial and Federal Litigation Section finds that the DOJ tends to bring criminal 
charges against individuals sued by the SEC in New York federal courts.21 It would seem 
                                                 
20 Securities and Exchange Commission, SEC Enforcement Actions, Insider 
Trading Cases. <http://www.sec.gov/spotlight/insidertrading/cases.shtml> 
21 
http://www.nysba.org/Content/ContentFolders4/CommercialandFederalLitigationSection/
ComFedReports/CRIMINALPROSECUTORIALDISCRETIONINTHEINSIDERTRADI
NGCASES.pdf 
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to follow, then, that if civil suits have increased so too have criminal prosecutions, which 
tend to move in tandem (albeit not on a one-to-one basis) with SEC actions.22 Moreover, 
the increased investigative collaboration between the SEC and the DOJ, as noted above, 
is likely to reinforce this trend. The use of technology, such as wiretaps and search 
warrants, has enhanced this collaboration as well as making it easier to secure insider 
                                                 
22 Note, however, that the DOJ does not pursue every individual that the SEC sues 
for insider trading. U.S. Assistant Attorneys have prosecutorial discretion over whether or 
not to bring criminal charges. See id. Recent evidence suggests that, at least in New 
York, “licensed professionals stand a greater chance of being prosecuted than others 
(including officers of public companies); tippers tend to be treated more harshly than 
tippees; sole actors may be treated more leniently than those who advance a fraudulent 
scheme by tipping others; clients who made or stood to make less money, or avoid 
smaller losses, on their unlawful trading may be viewed more favorably than those who 
enjoy greater gains; those who consent up-front to settlements with the SEC do not tend 
to be prosecuted by the criminal authorities; and those who commit aggravating or 
additional stand alone crimes are more likely to find themselves defendants in parallel 
criminal cases.” Id at 14.  
15
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trading convictions and/or guilty pleas.23 The recent Galleon insider trading case, which 
entered the public spotlight in 2009, is an interesting example of the helpful role of 
technology in securing convictions.  
Galleon was at one time a prestigious multi-billion dollar hedge fund, founded 
and controlled by Raj Rajaratnam. The SEC has charged Mr. Rajaratnam and nearly 30 
other persons affiliated with Galleon with violating § 10(b) of the Securities Exchange 
Act of 1934 and Rule 10b-5 thereunder, and § 17(a) of the Securities Act of 1933. The 
charges allege “widespread and repeated insider trading at numerous hedge funds, 
including Galleon, and by other professional traders and corporate insiders in the 
securities of more than 15 companies. The insider trading generated illicit profits totaling 
                                                 
23 See, e.g., Morrison and Foerster, Insider Trading, Year-End Review (2011). 
Available at http://www.mofo.com/files/Uploads/Images/2011-Insider-Trading-
Review.pdf. See also Charlie Gasparino and Sital Patel, Here’s a Tip: Insider Trading 
Cases Will Pile Up for Years, FOX Business, February 21, 2012, available at 
http://www.foxbusiness.com/industries/2012/02/21/heres-tip-insider-trading-cases-will-
pile-up-for-years/#ixzz1tjeqKL3Y 
 
16
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more than $90 million.”24 In 2011, Rajaratnam was convicted on all counts and sentenced 
to 11 years in prison, the longest criminal sentence for insider trading thus far. Many 
defendants have pled guilty and several are aiding prosecutors in ongoing litigation. The 
case has involved close cooperation by the SEC’s New York offices and the USA 
Attorney's Office for the Southern District of New York and the Federal Bureau of 
Investigation. 
Technology has played a critical role in the Galleon complex of cases, especially 
in enabling the conviction of Mr. Rajaratnam. Using taped conversations between Mr. 
Rajaratnam and his friends and business associates, the government was able to prove its 
allegations that he utilized his large network of contacts, including executives at major 
corporations such as Goldman Sachs, Intel, Proctor and Gamble, etc., to gather non-
public information that he subsequently traded on. Without the wiretaps, the 
government’s case would have been considerably more difficult to prove. The heart of 
the defense’s legal theory was the mosaic theory. This is the notion that Mr. Rajaratnam 
gathered public information from various sources to create a trading strategy (and that he 
                                                 
24 Securities and Exchange Commission, SEC Files Insider Trading Charges 
against Rajat Gupta, SEC Brings New Charges against Raj Rajaratnam, October 26, 
2011, available at http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2011/2011-223.htm. 
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was very good at it, a financial wizard) but did not engage in illegal insider trading. 
Unfortunately for the defense, however, many of Mr. Rajaratnam’s taped phone 
conversations were critical to his conviction.  
The government faced similar challenges in making its case in the recent (June 
2012) trial of Mr. Rajat Gupta. Mr. Gupta is former head of McKinsey and Company, 
and a former board member of Goldman Sachs and Proctor and Gamble. The SEC has 
charged Mr. Gupta with having supplied Mr. Rajaratnam with material non-public 
information concerning Goldman Sachs and Proctor and Gamble. According to the SEC, 
Galleon funds traded illegally on the basis of these tips, and made illegal profits (or 
avoided losses) greater than $23 million.25 The SEC claimed that Mr. Gupta tipped Mr. 
Rajaratnam in violation of insider trading laws because of the two men’s close personal 
relationship and extensive business dealings. Yet, Mr. Gupta never traded for his personal 
benefit. In spite of the fact that the evidence in Gupta’s case was largely circumstantial, 
Mr. Gupta was convicted on three counts of securities fraud and one count of conspiracy 
for passing information about Goldman to Mr. Rajaratnam.26 Mr. Gupta faces up to 20 
                                                 
25 Id. 
26 Id. 
18
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years in prison for each of the fraud charges and up to five years for the conspiracy 
charge. The expected sentence under Federal guidelines is significantly lower.27  
The Galleon case also illuminates USA regulators’ increasing scrutiny of so-
called “expert network firms.” These firms connect financial traders with industry 
consultants who provide them with industry- or company-specific information. They 
should only provide public information that can be found out through legal means. 
However, the SEC is concerned that expert network employees may sometimes be 
providing material, non-public information to traders in exchange for a fee. In 2010, for 
example, the SEC charged a French physician for tipping a hedge fund trader about 
adverse results of a clinical drug trial he had been involved in. According to the SEC, the 
physician had been providing:  
[C]onsulting services to the portfolio manager with whom he had developed a 
friendship over the years. The portfolio manager, based on the confidential 
information provided by Benhamou, ordered the sale of the entire position of 
HGSI stock held by six health care-related hedge funds that he co-managed 
(approximately 6 million shares). These sales occurred during the six-week period 
prior to HGSI's public announcement on Jan. 23, 2008, that it was reducing the 
                                                 
27 See Chad Bray et al., Insider Case Lands Big Catch, Wall Street Journal, 
Friday, June 15, 2012. 
19
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dosage in one arm of the trial. Two million shares were sold in a block trade just 
before the markets closed on January 22. HGSI's share price dropped 44 percent 
by the end of the day on January 23. As a result of the sales, the hedge funds 
avoided losses of at least $30 million.”28  
 
The SEC has recently charged or investigated several more employees of expert network 
firms and hedge funds who use them in separate insider trading cases.29 There are more 
cases in the pipeline and the impact on the hedge fund industry has been chilling.30 
 
II. Hypotheses and methodology 
 
A. Background 
 
                                                 
28 Securities and Exchange Commission, SEC Charges Medical Researcher With 
Tipping Inside Information About Clinical Trial, November 2, 2010, available at 
http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2010/2010-209.htm. 
29 See Galleon Trial, Network effects: A massive Insider-Trading Trial Shakes 
Wall Street, The Economist, March 10, 2011.  
30 Id. 
20
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The presence of illegal insider trading can only be inferred. It cannot be directly 
measured because illegal inside traders typically do not declare their intent in advance 
nor do they admit to engaging in illegal insider trading after the fact. In this study, we 
examine price effects on stocks and options around the announcement of tender offers to 
indirectly detect the presence of illegal insiders.  
Tender offers involve the efforts of accounting firms, investment banks, financial 
advisors, and executives of the bidder and target firms. Consequently, given many people 
are involved in the takeover, there are potentially many opportunities to illegally share 
and use the privileged confidential information. As noted above, trading on the basis of 
non-public information about an upcoming tender offer is explicitly illegal under Rule 
14e-3.31 Nevertheless, if potential illegal traders think that they can escape detection or 
prosecution, they are likely to be tempted. 
                                                 
31 The Rule provides that: 
 
As a means reasonably designed to prevent fraudulent, deceptive or 
manipulative acts or practices within the meaning of § 14(e) of the Act, it shall be 
unlawful for any person described in paragraph (d)(2) of this section to 
communicate material, nonpublic information relating to a tender offer to any 
21
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Recent developments in technology have created improved opportunities to hide 
one’s transactions. The growth of online brokerage houses has allowed many investors to 
place trade orders anonymously. Second, many off-shore foreign tax havens are refusing 
to co-operate with USA enforcement efforts. Given that more transactions can take place 
                                                                                                                                                 
other person under circumstances in which it is reasonably foreseeable that such 
communication is likely to result in a violation of this section except that this 
paragraph shall not apply to a communication made in good faith, 
i. To the officers, directors, partners or employees of the offering person, to its 
advisors or to other persons, involved in the planning, financing, preparation or 
execution of such tender offer; 
ii. To the issuer whose securities are sought or to be sought by such tender offer, to 
its officers, directors, partners, employees or advisors or to other persons, 
involved in the planning, financing, preparation or execution of the activities of 
the issuer with respect to such tender offer; or 
iii. To any person pursuant to a requirement of any statute or rule or regulation 
promulgated thereunder. 
22
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beyond the reach of USA regulators, more people may be tempted to engage in illegal 
insider trading activities.  
Takeovers are lucrative affairs. In a typical tender offer, stock prices rise 
significantly on the announcement of the tender offer. The increase in stock prices tends 
to be on the order of 20% to 30%. Evidence indicates that stock prices also tend to drift 
up prior to the announcement of the tender offer. Hence, corporate takeovers provide a 
perfect setting to exploit insider information. The large price increases on announcement 
provide excellent opportunities for illegal insider traders to buy the target shares before 
the announcement and thus profit illegally from the subsequent price increases.32  
In an early study, Keown and Pinkerton examine stock price movements in 93 
stocks that were eventually taken over during the period from 1975 to 1978.33 They find a 
13.25% run-up in stock prices during the 60 days before the takeover announcement. 
                                                 
32 A recent paper by Agrawal and Nasser finds that registered corporate 
executives and large shareholders refrain from profitable trading immediately before 
corporate takeovers. Hence, any illegal insider trading activity prior to the tender offers is 
most likely to come from affiliated persons rather corporate executives. Anup Agrawal & 
Tareque Nasser, Insider Trading in Takeover Targets, J. Corp. Fin. (forthcoming 2012). 
33 Arthur J. Keown & John M. Pinkerton, Merger Announcements and Insider 
Trading Activity: An Empirical Investigation, 36 J. Fin. 855 (1981). 
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Most of this run-up occurs during the 20 days immediately preceding the takeover 
announcement. On announcement, stock prices further increase by another 13%. Hence, 
about half of the total stock price reaction occurs prior to the public disclosure of the 
takeover attempt. Keown and Pinkerton also find that the trading volume also abnormally 
increases during the same 20 days prior to takeover announcements. Keown and 
Pinkerton interpret their evidence as being consistent with illegal insider trading driving 
up both stock prices and trading volumes prior to the public announcements. 
Subsequent studies also confirm the presence of pre-announcement run-ups in 
stock prices. For instance, studies by Asquith, Asquith and Mullins, and Dennis and 
McConnell all find similar stock price run-ups.34 Furthermore, these studies also attribute 
the pre-announcement run-ups to illegal insider trading activity.  
Various subsequent studies have investigated whether these run-ups in stock 
prices could be explained by alternative hypotheses. One such hypothesis is the presence 
of public information, such as rumors or 13-D filings, about the possibility of a tender 
                                                 
34 Paul Asquith, Merger Bids, Uncertainty, and Stockholder Returns, 11 J. Fin. 
Econ. 51 (1983). Paul Asquith et al., The Gains to Bidding Firms from Mergers, 11 J. 
Fin. Econ. 121 (1983); D. Dennis & J. McConnell, Corporate Mergers and Security 
Returns, 16 J. Fin. Econ 143 (1986). 
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offer, rather than insider trading.35 In a test of the public rumor hypothesis, Jarrell and 
Poulsen study 172 tender offers from 1981 to 1985.36 They find that the presence of 
rumors in the news media is the most significant variable that explains the unanticipated 
premiums and pre-bid stock price run-ups that Keown and Pinkerton documented. Jarrell 
and Poulsen also find that subsequent illegal insider trading investigations do not explain 
the pre-bid run-ups. Accordingly, they interpret their evidence as being inconsistent with 
                                                 
35 Schedule 13-D is an SEC filing that must be submitted with 10 days of 
acquiring a 5% or greater equity stake in any publicly held corporation.  The filer must 
disclose his/her purpose in acquiring this block, including whether the filer intends to 
launch a takeover bid.  Furthermore, 13-D filings must be updated to reflect any material 
changes, such as subsequent acquisition of disposition of more than 1% of the security 
for which an earlier filing was made.   See, e.g., Michael C. Jensen & Richard S. Ruback, 
The Market for Corporate Control: The Scientific Evidence,11 J. Fin. Econ. 5 (1983). 
However, John Pound and Richard Zeckhauser find that rumors accurately predict 
imminent takeover bids less than one-half of the time. John Pound & Richard 
Zeckhauser, Clearly Heard on the Street: The Effect of Takeover Rumors on Stock 
Prices, 63 J. Bus. 291 (1990). 
36 G. Jarrell & A. Poulsen, Stock Trading before the Announcement of Tender 
Offers: Insider Trading or Market Anticipation? 8 J.L, Econ. & Org. 225 (1989). 
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illegal insider trading and consistent with the public rumor hypothesis. However, Jarrell 
and Poulsen do not examine the source of the rumors. If the rumors about the tender 
offers were planted by those who acquired the information illegally, who took illegal 
stock positions and then spread the rumors, then pre-bid run-ups and illegal insider 
trading would be synonymous.  
Holding all else constant, traders who obtain illegal insider trading information 
about a forthcoming takeover would have incentives to surreptitiously plant rumors in the 
financial press about the upcoming potential takeover. First, once they have taken their 
positions, any newspaper stories about the takeover result in increases in stock prices and 
give additional profits to illegal insider traders.37 Second, the presence of rumors in the 
press gives the illegal insider traders a cover in case of a civil or criminal investigation. 
Illegal insiders can always point to the stories as to why they took up their stock positions 
in the target firms. Thus, it is not possible to clearly separate the rumor hypothesis from 
the illegal trading hypothesis. 
                                                 
37 See G. William Schwert, Markup Pricing in Mergers and Acquisitions, 41 J. 
Fin. Econ. 153 (1996). 
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In a cross-country study, Maug et al. examine pre-bid stock price run-ups in 48 
countries in almost 19,000 takeover announcements.38 They find that passing of the 
insider trading legislation affects the pre-bid stock price run-ups. In particular, they find 
that pre-bid stock price run-ups are significantly lower the more restrictive is a country’s 
insider trading law, other things equal. This finding suggests that at least some of the pre-
bid run-ups is due to illegal insider trading, which is reduced by the passing of tougher 
insider trading laws. 
Illegal insider trading prior to takeovers has important public policy and economic 
consequences. Meulbroek and Hart find that the presence of illegal insider trading prior 
to takeovers is associated with about 10% higher takeover premiums.39 Hence, illegal 
insider trading imposes costs on bidder firms’ shareholders by increasing the cost of the 
takeovers. As the costs of successful takeovers increase, we would also expect a 
                                                 
38 Ernst G. Maug et al., Insider Trading Legislation and Acquisition 
Announcements: Do Laws Matter? (2008) available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=868708. 
 
39 Lisa Meulbroek & Carolyn Hart, The Effect of Illegal Insider Trading on 
Takeover Premia, 1 Eur. Fin. Rev. 51 (1997). 
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deleterious effect on the number of takeover attempts, potentially reducing the incidence 
of value-enhancing changes in corporate control. 
 
B. Hypotheses and methodology 
 
In this study, we test whether illegal insider trading has become increasingly more 
common over time in the United States. We take two approaches to this question. First, 
we examine stock price run-ups prior to tender offer announcements over time. We 
investigate whether the likelihood and magnitude of the pre-bid run-up in target firms’ 
stock prices have increased over time. We also investigate whether bidder firms are more 
likely to make toehold investments in target firms over time and whether the price run-up 
can be explained by toehold investments.40 
                                                 
40 Toehold investments refer to the pre-announcement acquisition of shares by 
potential bidders. When any potential bidder acquires 5% of the outstanding shares, it 
needs to file a 13-D statement disclosing its position as well as its intent within 10 days. 
Public disclosures of toehold investments are associated with positive stock price 
reactions. Toehold investments also help facilitate change of control. See generally W. 
Mikkelson & R. Ruback, An Empirical Analysis of the Interfirm Equity Investment 
Process, 14. J. Fin. Econ. 523 (1985); Clifford G. Holderness and Dennis P. Sheehan, 
28
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Second, to distinguish between the public rumor and illegal insider trading 
hypotheses, we examine the pricing of stock options on the target firms. Both hypotheses 
predict stock price run-ups, as discussed above. However, public information (including 
rumors) and insider information should have opposite effects on the volatility of the 
target stock returns. If the observed stock price run-ups are due to publicly known rumors 
about the possibility of a takeover, then we would expect the implied volatility of the 
options on the takeover target to decline both prior to the announcement as well as on the 
announcement date. This is because takeovers are volatility-reducing events.  
In some takeovers, the bidder firm announces a fixed price (a cash offer) for the 
target firm. The fact that the target price is fixed if the offer is successful reduces the 
volatility of the target firm’s stock returns. Alternatively, instead of offering a fixed price, 
in some takeovers, the bidder firms offer a fixed number of bidder shares for target shares 
(a stock exchange offer). We expect exchange offers to also reduce the volatility of target 
stock returns, since the volatility of the target shares is replaced by the volatility of the 
bidder shares. Bidder firms are typically much larger than target firms and therefore they 
are less volatile.  
                                                                                                                                                 
Raiders or Saviors? The Evidence on Six Controversial Investors, 14 J. Fin. Econ. 555 
(1985); D. Choi, Toehold Acquisitions, Shareholder Wealth, and the Market for 
Corporate Control, 26 J. Fin. & Quant. Anal. 391 (1991).  
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In short, if the pre-bid run-up in stock prices is due to public rumors about a 
prospective tender offer, we would expect the volatility of the target firms’ stock returns 
to decline uniformly prior to the public announcement of the tender offers. As the run-up 
increases, volatility should decline more. This is because as the probability of the tender 
offer increases, there is a greater probability of a reduction in volatility of target returns. 
Hence, the public rumor hypothesis predicts a negative relation between the pre-bid run-
up in stock prices and volatility of the returns to target firms.  
In contrast, if illegal insider trading is driving the trading volume and price effects 
prior to corporate takeovers, then we would expect an increase in the implied volatility of 
the target firms’ stock returns. This is because illegal insiders can exploit their 
information more efficiently by buying call options on the target firm instead of common 
stock. Call options typically provide additional leverage given by the elasticity of the 
option prices. By using call options illegal insiders can further leverage the 
announcement day returns. Thus, illegal insiders would be willing to bid-up the price of 
the call options on a target firm in order to establish large options positions that would 
benefit from a run-up in the target stock price.  
Holding current stock price, exercise price and maturity constant, option prices 
are monotonically and positively related to option volatility. Consequently, holding all 
else constant, if call option prices increase as a result of the illegal insider trading, then 
implied option volatilities should also increase.  
30
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In summary, the public rumor hypothesis predicts that the implied volatility of 
target stock returns will decrease prior to takeover announcements. In contrast, the illegal 
insider trading hypothesis makes the opposite prediction, in particular that the implied 
volatility of target stock returns will increase prior to takeover announcements. Implied 
volatility thus provides an excellent framework for investigating our illegal insider 
trading hypothesis. 
To measure the implied volatility of the target returns, we follow Harvey and 
Whaley.41 We implement the binomial option pricing model on American options with 
dividends numerically to compute the implied volatility estimates. We adopt the 
conventional assumption that any dividend paid on the underlying stock is known in 
advance. The advantage of the binomial option pricing model is that it can explicitly 
incorporate the fact that these options are American options subject to early exercise.  
                                                 
41 See Campbell R. Harvey & Robert E. Whaley, Market Volatility Prediction and 
the Efficiency of the S&P 100 Index Option Market, 30 J. Fin. Econ. 43 (1992); 
Campbell R. Harvey & Robert E. Whaley, Dividends and S&P 100 Index Option 
Valuation, 12 J. Futures Markets 123 (1992). 
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Using the Newton-Raphson search procedure similar to the one suggested by 
Manaster and Koehler,42 we calculate the implied volatility for every call option 
transaction in our sample. More specifically, the following algorithm is employed: given 
an ith estimate implied volatility, the procedure suggests the i+1th should be: 
 
*
1
[ ( ) ( )]i
i i
C C
vega
    
 
 
Where ( )iC  is the price of the option with an implied volatility of i  computed from the 
binomial model, *( )C   is the observed option price and vega is the partial derivative of 
the option price with respect to volatility. We iterate on this procedure until the implied 
volatility has converged and the predicted price is equal to the market price43.  
                                                 
42 S. Manaster & G. Koehler, The Calculation of Implied Variances from the 
Black-Scholes Model: A Note, 37 J. Fin. 227 (1982). 
 
43 We divide days to maturity into 180 intervals. The convergence criterion is set 
to 0.001%. That is, the algorithm is considered convergent if the estimated price is within 
0.001% of the observed price. Ideally, the number of intervals should be dependent on 
the length of the days to maturity. However, there is a tradeoff in terms of computation 
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The literature on options valuation has uncovered systematic patterns on implied 
volatility as a function of the maturity and moneyness of the options.44 To avoid 
confounding takeover related effects with well-known biases in binomial options pricing 
with respect to maturity and moneyness, we restrict our attention to short-term options 
that extend beyond the takeover announcement date by no more than 30 days and are 
near the money. We define near the money options as with exercise prices within a 20% 
band of the current stock price. Changes in implied volatilities have been used in the 
literature to estimate price pressures on option prices.45  
                                                                                                                                                 
cost. We compare our estimates to the estimates we obtain from Black-Scholes when the 
underlying stock pays no dividends before expiration. Not surprisingly, they are very 
close to each other.  
44 See e.g., Robert E. Whaley, Valuation of American Call Options on Dividend-
Paying Stocks: Empirical Tests, 10 J. Fin. Econ. 29 (1982); Jeremy Stein, Overreactions 
in the Options Market, 44 J. Fin. 1011 (1989); Gurdip S. Bakshi et al., Empirical 
Performance of Alternative Option Pricing Models, 52 J. Fin. 2003 (1997). 
45 See, e.g., Kaushik Amin et al., Index Option Prices and Stock Market 
Momentum, 77 J. Bus. 835 (2004); Xuewu Wang, Three Essays in Insider Trading (Sept. 
3, 2011) (Ph.D. dissertation); H. Nejat Seyhun & Xuewu Wang, Past Stock Returns and 
Option Prices, International Research Journal of Applied Finance (forthcoming 2012). 
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C. Data and Results 
 
Our corporate takeover data come from SDC files from the Wharton Research 
database System (WRDS). Stock return data come from WRDS as well. Our options data 
come from OptionsMetrics Ivy DB Database. This database contains all exchange-traded 
options transactions after 1995.  
 
To ensure availability of the options data, we focus on tender offers after 1995. To 
ensure that the potential stock price reaction on the announcement date is economically 
important, we also use only tender offers where the bidder firms were eventually 
successful in obtaining at least 50% of the target shares.  
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Table 1  
Characteristics of the Tender Offer Sample 
           
Subsample 
Number of 
tender 
offers 
Percent 
Acquired
Total 
Value 
Acquired*
Initial 
Toehold 
Investment* 
Probability 
of Initial 
Toehold 
1996-2000 647 95.9 642.7 279.1 33.6% 
2001-2005 259 95.7 800.4 13.9 97.6% 
2006-2011 271 94.2 1,392.6 21.7 93.0% 
Total 1,177 95.4 850.1 148.8 48.3% 
* Millions of dollars. 
 
The sample characteristics of our tender offer database are shown in Table 1. Our 
database covers 1,177 tender offers from 1996 to 2011. Bidder firms acquired an average 
of 95.4% of the target firms through the tender offer. The average value of the target 
shares acquired equals $850 million. 
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As noted above, a pre-bid run-up in stock prices may be caused by toehold 
investments by the bidder firms that can also put upward pressure in target stock prices. 
Therefore, Table 1 also reports the average toehold investment by bidder firms, as well as 
the likelihood that a bidder firm made a toehold investment in a target firm. Just under 
half of the bidder firms bought a toehold in the target over the entire period (1996-2011). 
However, there is significant intertemporal variation in the probability of a toehold. 
During Period 1 (1996-2000), only 33.6% of the bidder firms bought a toehold 
investment in the target firms. During Period 2 (2001-2005), this ratio increased to 
97.6%. In Period 3 (2006-2011), the toehold investment proportion declined slightly to 
93.0%. As explained below, however, the increased prevalence of toehold investments 
does not appear to explain the increase in pre-bid stock price run-ups over time. 
Next, we compute abnormal returns to target firms. Abnormal returns are 
computed as the raw return minus the value-weighted market return from 50 days before 
the takeover announcement to 50 days after the takeover announcement. Implicitly, this 
approach assumes a Beta of one for all firms. Given the limited explanatory power of 
Beta, this simple market-adjusted return approach has been used frequently in the finance 
literature.46  
                                                 
46 See, e.g., Gibbons & Hess, The Day of the Week Effects and Asset Returns, 54 
J. Bus. 579 (1981); De Bondt & Thaler, Does the Stock Market Overreact, 40 J. Fin. 793 
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Once we find the abnormal returns, we then average them for each event day 
relative to the takeover announcement date, which is defined as day zero. That is, we 
average the abnormal returns for each day from 50 days before to 50 days after the 
takeover announcement date. Finally, we calculate the cumulative average abnormal 
returns from 50 days before to 50 days after the tender offer announcement date. 
 
Cumulative average abnormal returns to target firms are shown in Figure 2. We 
compute the cumulative average abnormal returns separately for the three sub-periods. As 
can be seen, stock prices rise abnormally prior to tender offers. During Period 1 (1996-
2000), stock prices rise abnormally by about 20%. Furthermore, approximately one-third 
of the total run-up or about 7% rise occurs prior to the public announcement of the tender 
offer. 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
(1985); Brown, Using the Daily Stock Returns: The Case of Event Studies, 14 J. Fin. 
Econ. 3 (1985).  
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Figure 2 
 
 
In Period 2 (2000-2005), stock prices rise about 17% from 50 days before to one 
day after the announcement date. Again, about one-third or about 7 percentage points of 
the rise occurs prior to the public announcement of the tender offer. Finally, during 
Period 3 (2006-2011), stock prices rise 28% from 50 days before to one-day after the 
tender offer announcement date. In the most recent sub-period, about 10 percentage 
points of the rise occurs prior to the public announcement.  
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Figure 2 shows that the market reaction to tender offers has increased over time. 
Along with this increase, the incentives to trade on tender offer announcements have also 
increased since greater stock price movements indicate availability of greater abnormal, 
albeit illegal trading profits. Our evidence also indicates that instead of declining, the pre-
bid run-up has increased over time. Compared to the pre-2006 periods, the pre-bid run-up 
during the last five years has increased by 50% (10 percentage points versus 7 percentage 
points). The increase in pre-bid stock price run-up does not appear to be driven by 
changes in toehold investments over time. While the probability of a toehold investment 
increases from 33.3% to 97.6% between Periods 1 and 2, this change is not accompanied 
by a proportionate or even significant increase in the pre-bid run-up. Furthermore, 
although between Periods 2 and 3 the likelihood of a toehold investment declines slightly, 
the pre-bid price run-up increases significantly. 
In short, the evidence in Figure 2 is consistent with the observation that higher 
levels of insider trading enforcement correspond to increased illegal insider trading 
activity, as reflected in a higher pre-bid stock price run up. 
We now turn to implied volatility tests. Sample characteristics of our options 
database are shown in Table 2. Our database contains about 45,000 options trades for 
firms involved in takeovers. The average remaining time to maturities is around 57 
39
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calendar days. The sample options tend to be at-the-money, with the average moneyness 
measure of the options about 1.0.47 Average implied call volatility is about 50%. 
 
Table 2 
Characteristics of the Options Sample 
Subsample 
Number of 
options 
Maturity 
(days) 
Moneyness 
of Call 
Options 
Call Implied 
Volatility 
1996-2000 17,692 55.74 0.992 0.59 
2001-2005 6,323 57.76 0.989 0.48 
2006-2011 21,916 58.16 0.990 0.41 
Total 45,931 57.17 0.991 0.49 
 
 
We next examine the time series properties of the implied volatilities of call 
options on target firms around the takeover announcement. Figure 3 shows implied 
volatilities of call options around the tender offers. Overall, implied volatility of call 
options rises during the 50 days prior to the takeover announcement. On the takeover 
                                                 
47 Moneyness of the options is defined as the stock price divided by the exercise 
price. 
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announcement date, the implied volatility falls by about half. Finally, during the 
subsequent 50 days after the takeover announcement date, the implied volatility rises 
slightly. In figure 3, there is no evidence of a fall in implied volatility prior to the 
announcement of the takeovers. 
 
 
 
Figure 3 
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In figure 4, we compute implied volatility for each of the three sub-periods 
separately. Evidence in figure 4 indicates that in all three sub-periods, implied volatilities 
of call options of target firms decline on the public announcement of the tender offer. The 
magnitude of the decline is large and statistically significant. On average, volatility 
declines by as much as one-half of the pre-announcement day volatility. Hence, our 
evidence confirms that tender offers reduce volatility of target stocks’ returns on 
announcement. 
 
 
Figure 4 
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In contrast with the announcement day reaction, volatility of target stock returns 
does not decline prior to the announcement in any of the three sub-periods. In fact, 
volatility typically increases prior to the announcement of the takeovers in each sub-
period. This figure is consistent with price pressure on call options, and inconsistent with 
the public rumor explanation. The public rumor hypothesis predicts a smoothly declining 
volatility prior to the announcement date as the tender offer is publicly anticipated. The 
lack of a smoothly declining implied volatility suggests that the tender offer 
announcement comes as a surprise to the market participants. Instead, consistent with the 
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price pressure hypothesis, volatility increases prior to the tender offer announcement 
dates. 
While not shown here, we undertook some additional tests. Specifically, the 
public rumor hypothesis predicts a negative relation between volatility and pre-bid run-up 
in stock prices. To test this hypothesis, we ran a regression of the changes in implied 
volatilities against the stock price run-ups. Our evidence suggests weakly positive 
relation between the two, instead of a negative relation as predicted by the public rumor 
hypothesis. This finding is inconsistent with the public rumor hypothesis.  
Rising implied volatility prior to the public announcement of the takeover implies 
increasing price pressure on option prices as predicted by illegal insider trading 
hypothesis. The fact that implied volatilities rise prior to tender offers can be seen from 
Figure 4. The increasing volatility is evident in all three sub-periods. Overall, Figure 4 is 
consistent with the presence of illegal insider trading prior to the announcement of the 
tender offers in all three sub-periods. 
 
III. Conclusions 
 
Recent evidence indicates increasing enforcement action against insider trading 
by the SEC and the Department of Justice. The SEC has more than doubled its 
enforcement actions between 2005 and 2010 compared to 1980s. At the same time, the 
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severity of punishment for insider trading convictions has also increased. The probability 
of receiving a prison sentence upon conviction has increased almost ten-fold over the past 
15 years. Similarly, the length of the median prison sentence upon conviction has more 
than doubled. 
In this study, we investigate whether these increased enforcement actions 
correspond to increased illegal insider trading activity. We examine the pricing of 
common stocks and options around the announcement of tender offers to detect the 
presence of illegal insider trading. Our objective is to determine whether illegal insider 
trading occurs before tender offers and whether illegal insider trading has become more 
rampant over time. 
Our evidence indicates that the pre-announcement run-up in stock prices has 
become larger over time. During the 2006-2011 sub-period, the pre-bid run-up is 50% 
higher than in thepre-2006 period. We also find that toehold investments by bidders do 
not explain the time-series variation in stock price behavior around takeovers. 
The evidence from option pricing is also consistent with illegal insider trading at 
work. We find that the implied volatility of option prices increases before the 
announcement of tender offers and decreases on the announcement date. This evidence is 
consistent with a price pressure on call option prices prior to the announcement of the 
tender offers. Overall, our evidence suggests that the recent increased insider trading 
45
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enforcement intensity in the USA most likely stems from an increased presence of illegal 
insider trading.  
That insider trading has apparently increased over time raises significant legal and 
policy questions. One such question is whether enforcement efforts and expenses 
sufficiently deter insider trading.  Relatedly, one may wonder whether the potential 
returns to illegal insider trading have become more lucrative the more stringent insider 
trading enforcement has become. 
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